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Introduction
Future spacecraft designers and managers need to 
be aware of problems, corrective actions, and the 
resulting lessons learned to avoid experiencing the 
same problems in new programs. Fewer and fewer 
people with firsthand experience of the design, test, 
and operations of past programs, such as Apollo, are 
available today to pass on their experience. This white 
paper, sponsored by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate Flight 
Safety Office (FSO), will discuss the major lessons I 
learned during my 50+ years (and counting) working in 
human spaceflight. 
I worked on all the major human spaceflight programs 
beginning with Apollo. I started my career in 1964 at 
NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), which is now 
JSC, in the Engineering and Development Directorate 
Power Distribution and Sequencing Section, where I 
was responsible for the design and testing of the Apollo 
Command and Service Module (CSM) sequencing 
system. I also served as the manager for the sequential 
subsystem for the Apollo CSM, Lunar Module (LM), and 
Skylab CSM, and I was a member of the Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project (ASTP) Working Group 4.
Later, I was assigned to the Engineering Office, Space 
Shuttle Orbiter Project. After transferring to the 
Mission Operations Directorate, I served as the first 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Flight Controller for Electrical, 
General Instrumentation, and Lighting (EGIL). I was 
also the Branch Chief for the Mission Operations 
Directorate Mechanical and Payload Systems Branch 
and the Guidance and Propulsion Systems Branch.
My experience in the Safety, Reliability, and Quality 
Assurance (SR&QA) Directorate, later called the SMA 
Directorate, began in 1985 when I became the Deputy 
Director. I was subsequently the co-chairman of the 
NASA/Mir Joint Safety Assurance Working Group, the 
Deputy Director of Russian Projects in SR&QA, and 
the co-chairman of the International Space Station 
(ISS) Program Joint American-Russian Safety Working 
Group.
I retired from NASA in 2006, but returned as a consultant 
in 2007 as a safety expert for the Constellation Program 
and a representative on the Orion Project Standing 
Review Board. I’ve also worked in the JSC SMA FSO 
since 2007. (For detailed career information, see 
Appendix A.)
My lessons learned are arranged according to themes, 
but many of the incidents I describe contain lessons on 
multiple themes. I hope this paper will communicate 
valuable experience to younger engineers, so they can 
continue to build on the lessons of the past to create 
even better human spaceflight programs.
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Redundancy can help or hinder
At the beginning of any spacecraft program the 
reliability goals and the redundancy philosophy 
for safety should be established. On the Apollo 
Program, the reliability goals were identified for each 
function to be performed. For example, the reliability 
apportionment established for the Service Module 
(SM) post-separation from the Command Module (CM) 
was 0.999985 (or 15 failures/10-to-the-6 missions, the 
reliability terminology used in 1965). If the function 
was safety-critical, the design should have no single-
point failures and should be fail-safe. The amount 
of subsystem redundancy was determined by the 
criticality, flight experience, and maturity of technology. 
As a result the redundancy varied. For example, fuel 
cells were a new technology for aerospace applications, 
while the electrical power buses and power contactors 
for switching were proven technology. Therefore, the 
redundancy level was three fuel cells and two main 
buses. For the alternating current (AC) power system 
the solid state inverters were a new technology for 
aerospace, and three inverters with two AC buses was 
the redundancy level. One inverter was always offline 
as a spare.
Apollo 10 (May 1969): Fuel Cell Failure
After docking with the Command and Service Module 
(CSM) and jettisoning the LM while the CSM was in 
lunar orbit, a caution and warning alarm sounded, 
and the Fuel Cell 1 AC circuit breaker tripped, due to 
a short in the hydrogen pump, causing the loss of Fuel 
Cell 1. The CM pilot told the commander he thought 
another one would go out as soon as they got to the 
back side of the moon. Halfway through the next night 
side pass, an alarm occurred on Fuel Cell 2 due to a 
fluctuation on the condenser exit temperature. With a 
minor electrical load reduction, Fuel Cell 2 continued 
to provide power.
Lesson: Critical systems should be two-fault 
tolerant. Consumables, like electrical power, 
which are required for crew safety should have an 
additional level of redundancy for missions beyond 
Earth orbit. 
Redundancy saved the crew in this case, since 
without redundancy in the fuel cells, the crew 
would not have had enough power to return to 
Earth. The CSM could safely return with one fuel 
cell down. 
Apollo 12 (November 1969): Lightning 
Strike
During the Apollo 12 launch on November 14, 1969 
lightning struck the spacecraft. At 11:22 am, T+36 
seconds, the crew saw a bright light. At T+36.5 
seconds many errors occurred:  Fuel Cells 1, 2, and 3 
disconnected; Main Buses A and B were under-voltage; 
AC buses 1 and 2 overloaded. The warning lights and 
alarm came on in the cabin, indicating the failure of the 
Inertial Stabilization System. At T+52 seconds (13,000 
feet) lightning struck the vehicle and the Inertial 
Measurement Unit platform tumbled.
The potential effect on the vehicle was induction into 
wiring, depending on the location and rate of change of 
potential and direct current (DC) flow in grounding. The 
high negative voltage spike (delta voltage/delta time) 
caused the Silicon Controlled Rectifiers to trip on the fuel 
cell and AC inverter overload sensors. Failures occurred 
in four SM Reaction Control System (RCS) helium tank 
quantity measurements, five thermocouples, and four 
pressure/temperature transducers.
Using power from the battery relay bus, the crew 
reconnected the fuel cells to Main Bus A and B, and 
reconnected the inverters to AC Bus 1 and 2. The 
mission continued.
Good structural electrical bonding among the Launch 
Escape System, CM, SM, Spacecraft LM Adapter, and 
Saturn V Inertial Unit prevented major damage to the 
systems and vehicle. The Launch Vehicle Instrument 
Unit computer provided ascent guidance and control 
since the CM computer, which was the backup for 
ascent, stopped working at the lightning strike. Ascent 
abort sensor processing (Emergency Detection System) 
was performed by the Instrument Unit avionics. Having 
the redundant computer for ascent guidance and 
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control located in the launch vehicle instead of the CM 
saved this mission. CM battery power prevented the 
loss of all electrical power when fuel cells disconnected 
from the main buses. This allowed the crew to recover 
and reset the fuel cell connections to the main buses.
Lesson: Redundant systems for critical functions 
should be dissimilar and/or located in different 
parts of the vehicle.
Skylab 3 (July 1973): Propellant Leak and 
Rescue Mission
During the rendezvous on July 28, 1973 Commander 
Alan Bean saw the first indication of a problem: the 
attitude was off about 25 degrees in yaw. According to 
fellow astronaut Owen Garriott, Jack Lousma “suddenly 
announced, ‘Owen, there goes one of our thrusters 
floating by the window.’”1 
The CSM RCS Quad B forward-firing positive-yaw engine 
oxidizer valve had leaked, and the nitrogen tetroxide 
had frozen into the shape of the thruster exhaust cone. 
The crew also reported a “snow storm” on the right 
side (Quad B side) of the spacecraft at the same time. 
The Quad was isolated, and the rendezvous had to be 
completed with only three of the four SM Quads. The 
crew members had not trained for this, but were able 
to complete the docking to Skylab. 
Five days later after docking to Skylab, the Quad D 
engine package temperature had decreased, causing 
an alarm. The crew saw a “snow storm” blowing by 
the window and knew that something was leaking 
from Skylab. With guidance from the ground, the RCS 
engines were inhibited, and the isolation valves closed 
about 1 hour and 20 minutes later. This second oxidizer 
leak prompted a concern that the oxidizer portion of 
the SM RCS had a problem. 
If this were true the remaining SM RCS Quads could fail, 
and preparations began at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
for a rescue mission. By eliminating subsystem tests the 
spacecraft CSM-119 could be mated with its Saturn 1B 
1 Hitt, Garriott, and Kerwin, Homesteading Space: The 
Skylab Story, page 239
launch vehicle the next week. Removing storage lockers 
allowed for two more crew couches to be installed 
under the existing three. Deleting the Countdown 
Demonstration Test meant the spacecraft and launch 
vehicle could be ready in early September. The Skylab 
Multiple Docking Adapter had been designed with a 
spare radial docking port, in case a rescue spacecraft 
might have to dock. Commander Vance Brand and Pilot 
Don Lind were assigned as the rescue crew. 
While rescue preparations were underway, Engineering 
concluded that the SM Quads did not share a common 
problem. The only condition that would match the 
timeline of events and leakage rates experienced 
on Quad D was an improperly torqued Dynatube 
connector. A contingency procedure was developed 
so that if another SM RCS Quad failed, the CM RCS 
could be used to de-orbit and for control during entry. 
The mission was allowed to continue, and the Skylab 
rescue capability was available if needed. 
The innermost and primary seal of a Dynatube connector 
is a mirror-finished, metal-to-metal seal. The second 
seal is a butyl O-ring.  Tests showed that a finger-tight 
Dynatube connection would pass a preflight helium 
leak test. However, when the RCS system is pressurized 
prior to liftoff, the oxidizer penetrates the unmated 
primary metallic seal, and the O-rings alone seal the 
connection. Tests showed the butyl O-ring degrades 
and can start leaking when exposed to nitrogen 
tetroxide at flight temperatures and pressures. The 
butyl O-ring seal was considered a redundant seal, but 
did not actually provide redundancy, creating a false 
sense of security. 
Lesson: Redundant systems must use compatible 
materials to be effective. Flight-critical fluid 
connections should have controls in place to insure 
proper torquing of connections, and seals should 
be compatible with the fluid they are trying to seal. 
The program’s early planning to develop a Skylab 
rescue capability allowed a rescue mission to be 
developed quickly. 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Electrical System
Redundancy can help or hinder
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During the Space Shuttle Program, the orbiter 
avionics were required to have an additional level of 
redundancy (three levels) compared with what was 
required for the Apollo Program (two levels). This was 
because the new digital avionics system had no proven 
flight experience. This also applied to other systems, so 
that launches could continue even if one system failed. 
(This supported not only safety, but the goal of the 
shuttle launching repeatedly with a quick turnaround, 
like an airline.) 
The orbiter had three hydraulic systems and was 
powered by three auxiliary power units, three fuel 
cells, and three main electrical buses. Early in the 
design phase the orbiter contractor’s manager for 
electrical systems and the NASA electrical power 
distribution engineers recommended not to require 
the extra redundancy (three levels) to the main DC bus 
system, since it was very reliable and had been flight 
proven. This recommendation was not adopted, and 
the orbiter power system was designed with three 
redundant systems. The additional level of redundancy 
added cost and complexity to the electrical power 
distribution systems. While redundancy is often 
beneficial, increasing the complexity of a system 
introduces the possibility for more problems and 
greater risk. Unnecessary redundancy can hinder a 
program’s development by adding cost and introducing 
new issues.
Lesson: To minimize spacecraft complexity, weight, 
cost, and schedule the level of redundancy should 
depend on the criticality, flight experience, and 
technology maturity of the hardware. Unnecessary 
redundancy adds complexity, which increases cost 
and risk.
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Expect the unexpected, and never stop 
learning
When you are responsible for a spacecraft crew safety 
system, even if you meet the program requirements 
for operation and redundancy, you need to imagine 
situations in which something unexpected happens or 
something unexpected fails. What if the Lunar Module 
batteries need to be charged (Apollo 13)? What if 
two of the three docking probe contacts fail to close, 
preventing probe retract (Apollo 14 and Skylab 2)? 
What if the electrical short only occurs in zero gravity 
(Apollo 15)? What if the launch vehicle structurally 
fails or the spacecraft upper deck sharp edges cut the 
parachute risers (Apollo Mission A-003)?
Apollo 13 (April 1970): Oxygen Tank 
Explosion
During trans-lunar flight at approximately 56 hours, 
one of the two SM oxygen tanks over-pressurized and 
exploded, causing the loss of oxygen in that tank and 
an oxygen leak in the remaining tank. This resulted in 
loss of all three fuel cells, loss of the primary oxygen 
source, and loss of electrical power to the CM except 
for the entry batteries. We know how the mission was 
able to continue with the use of the Lunar Module 
and the crew safely returned. My support was in the 
Mission Evaluation Room (MER) at the CSM Electrical 
Power Distribution and Sequencing position. When the 
explosion of the SM oxygen tank occurred, I was in the 
MER and did not leave until the next morning. By then 
the CSM was completely unpowered and the main 
activity was with the engineers supporting the active 
LM systems.
Prior to Apollo 13, I had thought about how to possibly 
use the CM’s battery charger to charge the LM batteries 
if needed. I worked with the LM Electrical Power 
Subsystem Manager, and we developed a procedure 
using an on-board umbilical to electrically connect the 
battery charger output on a CM bus to the LM bus.
After the explosion of the SM oxygen tank, we later 
used this procedure in reverse to provide power to the 
unpowered CM from the LM.2 
2 This was mentioned in the book Apollo: the Race to the 
Moon by Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox on page 
Later I worked on the CM power-up configuration 
before the jettison of the LM before re-entry. This 
consisted of marking up a CM display panel drawing 
with switch and circuit breaker positions (marked red 
if the circuit breaker was to be closed and marked blue 
if was to be open). The switch position was shown 
by a red arrow in the direction to be positioned. This 
information was provided to the Flight Control Team 
that converted the information to a checklist to be read 
to the crew. I still have the marked-up document, “V34-
900101, Rev. AC, Controls & Displays – Main Display 
Console Panels drawing A1 & A2, SC 109 Thru 115A, 
1-23-70.” After the mission I was involved in the NASA 
investigation as to what caused the SM oxygen tank to 
explode. I still have the chart of total fuel cell electrical 
current that was used in the investigation.
Prior to launch, several conditions resulted in the 
oxygen tank failing during the mission. By design, the 
cryogenic oxygen tank required both electrical heaters 
to maintain pressure and fans to prevent stratification. 
The tank was a complex assembly with blind installation 
of the quantity probe, heater/fan assembly, and fill 
tube. This design left wiring insulation vulnerable to 
damage during assembly with no way to inspect after 
installation. The Teflon-insulated wiring was in close 
proximity to the heater elements and fan and is a 
combustible material in the oxygen tank. The Apollo 13 
tanks had originally been installed on Apollo 11, but 
a change required the tanks to be removed. During 
removal of the oxygen shelf, one bolt was left in place 
causing the fixture to break and resulting in a two-inch 
drop of the shelf and tanks. Although a loosely fitting 
(due to loose specification tolerances) fill tube could 
have been displaced by this, all testing was passed. 
No cryogenic tests which would have revealed the 
problem were performed. 
During the Countdown Demonstration Test the oxygen 
tank could not be emptied by the normal means of 
pressurized oxygen gas. A leak at the fill tube would 
cause this. Instead, the tank heaters were turned on 
to boil off the oxygen in the tank. The thermostatic 
439. (“The MER had figured out a way to pass power 
from the LEM [or LM] to the CSM...”)
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switches were rated for 30 volts DC, but several years 
earlier the heater ground power supply voltage was 
raised to 65 volts to reduce the pressurization time. 
As the temperature increased, the thermostatic switch 
opened, and the higher voltage caused the contacts 
to weld closed. With the heaters continuously on, the 
temperature approached 1000 degrees and damaged 
the wire insulation, setting up the conditions for a 
short and ignition inside the tank. Ground personnel 
did not notice the continuous heater operation. During 
the prelaunch problem solving neither the Apollo 
Spacecraft Program Manager nor the KSC Director of 
Launch Operations knew the tank had previously been 
dropped or that the heaters had been on for eight 
hours straight.
Lesson: My biggest contribution to this event was 
the contingency procedure developed prior to 
the mission, which was used to provide critical 
electrical power from the LM to the CM. Try to 
anticipate unexpected problems that may arise 
and solve the problem in advance.
The design for critical hardware should avoid 
blind installation that prevents post-assembly 
verification. Materials associated with gaseous 
or cryogenic oxygen should be compatible. The 
design should specify tolerances that take into 
account the worst case stack-up and prevent 
problems due to tolerance variation. Changes to 
hardware operation should be verified to be within 
the hardware design limits. Ground test consoles 
should have both visual and audible alarm limits 
for critical operating parameters. Redundancy in 
life support, LM life support systems, propulsion, 
communication, and GNC allowed for the safe 
recovery of the crew. 
Apollo 14 (January 1971): Docking Problem
Prior to the launch of Apollo 14 I was working as 
the Apollo Sequential Subsystem Manager and was 
concerned that the two small pyrotechnic batteries A 
and B could fail, as they were not able to be recharged 
like the entry batteries. I started thinking of an 
alternative way to fire the pyrotechnics in case the 
batteries failed. I developed a procedure to fire the CM 
pyrotechnics by using the 16 mm camera cable that 
connected to a utility power outlet. One connector 
would be cut off, exposing the three wires. One 28-volt 
wire and one power return could then be inserted 
into the sequencer box access connector. Step 9 of 
the procedure addressed “No docking probe retract,” 
since retracting the CSM docking probe required firing 
a pyrotechnic.
After Apollo 14’s launch and trans-lunar injection the 
crew proceeded to dock to the LM. The crew made six 
attempts at capture (soft dock), which required two 
of three capture latches to close to apply power to 
the pyrotechnic to retract the probe, so the crew was 
unable to obtain hard dock with the LM. 
After several docking attempts, I went back to the 
office to get the emergency procedure memorandum. 
To make sure the crew could do the procedure, Apollo 
astronaut Ken Mattingly went with the crew tool 
kit to a previously flown CM in the JSC Auditorium. 
He was able fix a cable and gain access to the Lunar 
Docking Events Controller connector J5 located in the 
right-hand equipment bay. This showed the procedure 
could be done. Mattingly and I hurried back and found 
out the crew had finally been able to dock after six 
unsuccessful attempts. 
A discussion took place about continuing the mission 
as planned. If you were unable to obtain capture during 
docking of the LM ascent stage to the CSM in lunar orbit, 
you might not be able to transfer the crew to the CSM, 
so the Mission Control Center (MCC) would not have 
continued the mission unless a backup probe-retract 
procedure were available. However, knowing we had 
a backup procedure the MCC allowed the mission to 
continue.  
Lesson: Anticipate how the system could fail and 
prepare potential work-arounds. You never know if 
they may be needed to continue a mission.
Apollo 15 (July 1971): Propulsion System 
Flight Safety Office11JS-2018-009
Electrical Short
During the mission, after trans-lunar injection and just 
after transposition and docking, the SM Propulsion 
System (SPS) thrust light illuminated with no engine fire 
command present. This light indicated the presence of 
a short to structure in the SPS ignition circuitry. Ignition 
would have occurred if the engine had been armed. 
This condition was a “No Go” for Lunar Orbit Insertion. 
I noted that the short indication first occurred briefly, 
just after Earth orbit insertion when the spacecraft was 
in zero gravity, and then occurred the second time as 
mentioned above after trans-lunar injection. 
In reviewing the SPS circuitry the only place to find 
something floating in a closed cavity was the delta-V 
thrust panel switch. This switch contained a braided 
wire which could have a loose wire strand, and if it 
shorted to the case (ground) it would illuminate the 
SPS thrust light. This would explain what the crew was 
seeing. The MER Manager gave permission for me to 
go to the MCC to explain this theory of what might be 
causing the thrust indication. 
I explained what I considered to be the cause of the 
indication to Dr. Christopher Kraft. Dr. Kraft said this 
sounded plausible, but that we needed to perform 
a test to prove the short was causing the light to 
illuminate, and not a fire command to the SPS. The 
crew procedure was modified for a test firing of the 
SPS during a mid-course correction. The successful 
firing verified that the short was isolated to the system 
A delta-V thrust switch and allowed implementation 
of an alternate procedure to safely fire the SPS engine 
and successfully continue the mission.3 Post-flight 
failure analysis showed that a loose wire strand from 
the braided wire inside the delta-V thrust panel was 
3 Dr. Christopher Kraft stated in NASA SP-350, Apollo 
Expeditions to the Moon, “The Operations Team, 
working with Don Arabian, a legend in his own time, and 
Gary Johnson, an excellent young electrical engineer, 
isolated the short to one of two systems. A test firing was 
initiated by the crew to verify that the short existed on 
the ground side of one of two sets of valves. Procedures 
were then developed by the ground, working with the 
flight crew, and the mission continued.”
causing the short to structure.
Lesson: The flight environment can cause 
unexpected anomalies which would not have 
occurred on Earth. In this case, a short to structure 
occurred due to a loose piece of wire floating in 
zero gravity.
The SPS engine fire command is switch to structure 
(negative bus), while short to structure is more likely 
to occur. The engine fire command should require 
a positive voltage signal. Switch components that 
have an internal cavity should be free of possible 
sources of conductive debris.
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In a complex organization with many teams made up of 
many people, documentation enables information to be 
shared. Sharing information is key when many groups 
will be working on different aspects of one project, 
like a spacecraft. Any modifications to spacecraft 
design or installation need to be documented and 
communicated to the other systems and personnel. 
When significant anomalies happen, the results of 
formal board investigations should be shared widely to 
avoid repetition of the same mistakes. Mission reports 
should include significant mission anomalies and should 
be updated if a problem comes to light after the report 
is written. Flight operation changes to a crew checklist 
system procedure need to be reviewed by the engineers 
responsible for that spacecraft system. Drawings from 
a previous spacecraft program or mission must include 
all engineering changes to that drawing. A spacecraft 
project engineer, besides understanding his system, 
should know and work with the design, manufacturing, 
test, and operations personnel for that system, even 
though they may work under another organization, 
vendor, or launch center.
Apollo-Saturn Mission 201 (February 
1966): Loss of Reaction Control System
During the uncrewed Apollo-Saturn (AS-201) mission 
after CSM separation, a short to power occurred 
causing the RCS commands to be transferred from the 
CM to the SM, resulting in the loss of RCS control. This 
transfer of command circuits to the shorted umbilical 
due to entry heating caused a large short and low 
voltage on Main Bus A and B till the circuit breakers 
opened. After the loss of the RCS, the CM went into 
a stable roll and did a ballistic entry instead of the 
planned lifting re-entry.
The cause of all this was a non-functional circuit 
that was routed through the CSM umbilical that was 
not deadfaced prior to separation, and it shorted, 
tripping the circuit breaker powering the Sequential 
Events Control Subsystem System B circuit causing 
loss of the redundant Earth Landing System (ELS). The 
non-functional circuit had been dropped from the 
drawings, but the wiring was left in the spacecraft and 
was not disconnected from power.  Since it was not on 
the drawing for the powered wiring going through the 
CSM umbilical, it was not deadfaced prior to guillotine 
of the umbilical.
Redundant NASA Standard Initiators, one powered by 
System A and one by System B (this source failed), were 
used on all critical pyrotechnic functions, including the 
ELS, and this allowed for recovery of the CM.
Lesson: Drawings should include all design changes, 
even disconnected or unused circuits. The lack of 
documentation in this case meant that the design 
drawings did not match the spacecraft, which 
made it more difficult to identify the problem. 
Also, all non-functional circuits left in the spacecraft 
should be disconnected from both power and 
return. Careful review must be made to ensure 
all powered wiring through an umbilical to be 
guillotined must be deadfaced prior to cutting with 
the guillotine.  
Apollo Environmental Control System (April 
1966): Fire
On April 28, 1966 a fire occurred at the AiResearch 
Torrance Facility in California in the altitude chamber 
used to simulate the interior environment of the 
Apollo CM (100% oxygen at five psi). The Apollo Block 
1 Environmental Control System (ECS) was undergoing 
a 500-hour mission-duration qualification test. The fire 
severely damaged the ECS and test setup equipment, 
but the damage was confined within the test chamber. 
The test was later repeated successfully and without 
incident, both with a new set of Block I hardware and 
then again with an ECS of the Block II configuration. 
An MSC Fire Investigation Board was appointed on May 
3, 1966 by Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director of the MSC, 
to independently investigate the cause of the fire. At 
the request of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, 
I was assigned to participate in the fire investigation 
to determine the ignition cause. I was working at the 
time as the CSM electrical power distribution project 
engineer. 
Documenting and sharing information: 
communication is key
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I investigated the test setup wiring and the sequence of 
events leading to the start of the fire and interviewed 
the AiResearch instrumentation engineer in charge of 
the test. When the fire occurred, the chamber had been 
evacuated for several days to simulate a depressed 
cabin environment, which was part of the test profile, 
and was being repressurized with oxygen to five psi in 
preparation for the next test phase. The last change in 
configuration before the start of the fire was increasing 
the voltage on the steam duct heater, and 48 seconds 
later the chamber dome lifted due to the increased 
pressure from the fire. 
The most probable cause of the fire was a failure of 
the commercial quality strip heater used to add heat to 
the steam duct (the line from the suit heat exchanger 
and glycol cooling evaporator to the vacuum source) 
to preclude freezing of water in the duct. This duct 
was wrapped with two strips of the heater tape and 
overwrapped with asbestos tape. During the interview 
the instrumentation engineer stated that the electrical 
technician had purchased the heater tape from Sears. 
This was the same type used to wrap a house’s outside 
water line to prevent freezing. I was told not to put in 
my report that the electrical technician had installed 
Sears heater tape for the duct heater. No analysis had 
been done to see if the commercial tape wire insulation 
could withstand the temperature it would be exposed 
to. The steam duct heater wire had previously shorted 
outside the dome near a splice like the splice to the 
heater tape in the dome, where the wire was open and 
looked like it had arced. 
I never saw the official board’s report, because it was 
not distributed even to those that participated in the 
investigation. I had made a recommendation about a 
possible ignition source on the test setup wiring, but 
never found out if my recommendation was included. 
Lesson: Information about mishaps should be 
shared, so that NASA can learn from its mistakes 
to possibly prevent future accidents. The 
investigation board’s official report was classified, 
limiting knowledge of the incident and preventing 
the lessons learned from being widely understood. 
This event should have been a wake-up call. It 
revealed issues that would appear again during 
the Apollo 1 fire (no engineering assessment of 
materials at 16 psi pure oxygen and no protection 
of Teflon wiring from physical damage to prevent 
arcs from shorts). Materials must be compatible 
with the environment (temperatures and pure 
oxygen exposure), but this commercial hardware 
had undergone no engineering analysis to show it 
was compatible with the test environment.  
Apollo 8 (December 1968): Launch Pad 
Electrical Test 
The Apollo Program Manager stated that if everything 
went well on the Apollo 7 mission, we would plan for 
Apollo 8 to be the first launch to go to the moon.  NASA 
also thought the Russians would do a circumlunar flight 
before we did, so this launch and flight had particular 
pressure and concern. The AC system had electrical 
shorts on Apollo 7, but the cause had been identified 
and was thought to be fixed. However, the Program 
Manager directed that we run a test on the Apollo 8 
spacecraft to carefully check out and test every AC load 
and component on the spacecraft, because he wanted 
to be absolutely certain nothing would go wrong with 
the AC system. 
I was assigned to develop and run tests on the CSM 
AC electrical system and record the voltage, current, 
power factor, and wattage of every AC-powered load. 
I worked for about a week in Houston planning what 
needed to be done. I already knew and had been 
working closely with flight operations at the North 
American Rockwell Space Division (NARSD) Downey, 
California design and test division, as well as the KSC 
and NARSD launch processing CSM power distribution 
personnel.  The CSM 2TV-1 and Spacecraft-008 vehicles 
(full-up vehicles) had been tested in the large vacuum 
chamber at JSC, so I ran my planned tests of the AC 
system on 2TV-1.  
Then I went to KSC, and Apollo 8 was on the pad. I spent 
a week at KSC writing the test procedure. I had known 
and previously worked with the NASA and contractor 
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electrical power distribution engineering personnel, so 
they were very helpful in getting me the information I 
needed on the launch pad, such as spacecraft interfaces 
and required paperwork to develop the test on the AC 
system. I was very nervous at that time, even though I 
had run the test at JSC, because this was the first time 
I’d been responsible for a vehicle being tested at KSC 
on the pad for an upcoming moon mission, and making 
sure it worked with all the KSC ground support and 
connections for spacecraft checkout at the pad. 
The test procedure was many pages. Even though I 
was very careful and worked closely with the NASA 
KSC and contractor engineers, I was sure they would 
carefully check my work as I was going through the 
required engineering and management approval 
signatures for the test. I assumed that the KSC 
engineers would carefully scrutinize the work of a 
young, visiting engineer from JSC. However, when this 
lengthy procedure started making its way through the 
signature chain, people signed off very quickly. They 
told me it seemed like I had checked with the right 
people and done the right things. I went through all the 
required signature chains for the test procedure, and 
no one had thoroughly checked my work. That made 
me even more nervous. 
The test was scheduled for the third shift, meaning in 
the evening. I was out at the Saturn V launch pad in the 
White Room, sitting just outside the open crew hatch, 
with my test procedure and headset on to monitor the 
test, and the ground test crew was in the spacecraft. 
About halfway through the test, suddenly everything 
went black, and the lights in the White Room went off. 
I almost had a heart attack. I thought, “My goodness, 
what have I done?” Then I heard the control center 
say we had lost facility power, and I looked inside the 
hatch and saw all the spacecraft lights were still on, 
and everything was fine. The Florida Power and Light 
Company (which in those days we called “Florida Light 
and Flicker”) had experienced a power failure, so the 
lights in the White Room had gone off, which caused 
everything to go dark.  The spacecraft itself was on 
backup emergency battery power, so it was fine.  It 
turned out there was nothing wrong with my test, but 
at the time all I could think was, “You’re responsible for 
scrubbing the Apollo 8 mission.” That experience stuck 
with me a long time. 
Lesson: On a critical task make sure your work is 
correct. Do not depend on someone else reviewing 
and checking your work. In this case, information 
was thoroughly documented and shared among 
organizations, but only one person was truly 
ensuring that the information was correct. Take 
the time to do your homework, and don’t assume 
someone else will double check your work.
Apollo 11 (July 1969): Service Module Entry 
About five minutes after CM/SM separation, the crew 
reported seeing the SM fly by to the right and a little 
above them, straight ahead. It was first visible in 
window number 4, then later in window number 2, and 
spinning. The CM should never have been close enough 
to see the SM after separation. During lunar return, if 
the SM contacted the CM in the entry corridor the result 
would be catastrophic, so this triggered an anomaly 
investigation. Photographs obtained by aircraft showed 
the SM entering Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrating 
in the vicinity of the CM entry corridor.  Radar tracking 
confirmed what the photographs had shown.  The 
radar tracking data for the previous Apollo 8 and 10 
lunar return missions were similar to Apollo 11, with 
the SM entering in the same corridor as the CM. 
To prevent SM re-contact with the CM during entry, 
a System A and redundant System B SM Jettison 
Controller (SMJC) were located in the SM. As the Apollo 
Sequential Events Control System NASA Subsystem 
Manager, I was responsible for the design and 
development of the SMJC. Redundant signals from the 
crew operated a guarded CM/SM separation switch, 
which would initiate a sequence in each SMJC, firing 
all four –X SM RCS jets. Two seconds later it would fire 
the four RCS roll jets, and three seconds later would 
terminate the four RCS roll jets, while the –X RCS jets 
continued to fire. Electrical power for the SMJCs and 
the RCS came from the still-active fuel cells in the SM, 
and the RCS used the residual SM RCS propellant.
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The investigation analysis showed that under certain 
conditions, such as propellant slosh after separation, 
re-contact could occur. We were lucky, as analysis 
showed that if the –X RCS jets were turned off after 
25 seconds it would prevent any chance of re-contact. 
That change was then made to the SMJCs for the later 
Apollo missions.
This anomaly was not in any of the Apollo 11 mission 
reports, and I had forgotten about this close call 
prompting a design change to the SMJC. However, in 
December 2016 when looking back through my files, 
I found MSC-03466 “Apollo 11 Anomaly Report No. 3 
Service Module Entry,” dated November 1970.  Since 
the date is long after the Apollo 11 mission in July 
1969, this is probably the reason the anomaly is not 
mentioned in any of the Apollo 11 mission reports. 
I had previously been concerned that the Orion 
spacecraft SM currently being designed and built by 
the European Space Agency for NASA’s Orion Program 
did not have a requirement for an active controller 
after CM/SM separation. When I mentioned this, the 
Orion Program personnel said their analysis indicated 
that the present design met their requirements. The 
CM/SM separation force is provided by springs with 
the CM RCS firing after separation. No safety hazard 
report had been written to address the hazard of SM 
re-contact with CM during entry. When I rediscovered 
the Apollo 11 anomaly report, I passed the information 
along to the Orion Program.  So far it has generated an 
action to develop a safety hazard report to cover SM 
re-contact with CM during entry. 
Lesson: Lessons learned should be freely available 
and shared. Mission reports should be updated 
to include anomaly and failure investigations that 
occur after the mission.  Also, because the crew 
had reported seeing the SM during the Technical 
Crew Debriefing, this information was stamped 
“confidential” and was prevented from appearing 
in the Apollo 11 mission reports. This example 
shows that the quality of the documentation and 
sharing of information from past programs can 
have a direct impact on future programs, which 
need to be aware of all the potential hazards they 
may face.
Skylab 2 (May 1973): Emergency Docking 
Procedure
After Skylab rendezvous and approach, the first 
objective was a “soft docking” at Skylab’s forward port, 
engaging capture latches but not retracting the CM’s 
docking probe to obtain hard dock. Then the crew 
released the capture latches, backed away from Skylab, 
flew around to a stuck solar panel with the side hatch 
open, and tried to free the solar panel. Unable to free 
the solar panel, the crew closed the side hatch and 
proceeded with the final docking to Skylab.
After numerous attempts, the crew was unable to 
achieve soft dock. Movement after the previous soft 
dock may have damaged the capture latches. There 
was one more procedure in the checklist labeled “Final 
Docking Attempt.” Following the checklist, the crew 
members donned the pressure suits, depressed the 
cabin, opened the tunnel hatch, removed the probe 
cover, and cut the wires. They also connected the 
emergency retract cable to the Utility Power Outlet 
and the other end of the cable to the Lunar Docking 
Events Controller connector J5. After firing the probe 
retract pyro using utility outlet power, the commander 
was able to make direct contact, triggering the 12 
structural latches and achieving hard dock.
The procedure for achieving hard dock when capture 
had failed was developed during the Apollo 14 mission 
(see “Expect the unexpected, and never stop learning”). 
After Apollo 14 a special cable was developed and 
stowed in the CM and the right-hand equipment bay 
panel was modified to allow quick access to the J5 
connector. The procedure did not require removing the 
probe retract cover to cut wires, for which the crew had 
to be suited and the cabin depressed. Later, without 
coordinating with Engineering, the Flight Operations 
personnel changed the crew checklist to require the 
cutting of the probe wires. 
The culture at the time was that only Flight Operations 
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and the crew were involved in developing the crew 
checklist procedure, and Engineering did not have 
the opportunity to review the crew checklist. The 
official Engineering interface with Flight Operations on 
crew procedures was via the Crew Procedure Change 
Request. 
Lesson: Organizational culture should encourage 
interdepartmental communication. In this case, 
because organizations outside of Flight Operations 
could not review and approve crew procedures, 
the Skylab 2 crew used a much riskier procedure, 
which required donning suits and depressurizing 
the cabin. Engineering’s procedure could have 
been performed using only the emergency probe 
retract cable without requiring access to the 
docking probe.  
Sharing information across organizations can 
enable better, more informed decisions.  A process 
change with regard to reviewing crew procedures 
occurred after the Space Shuttle Challenger 
accident when, over the objections of Flight 
Operations, the Space Shuttle Program approved 
the request from SR&QA to allow safety engineers 
to review the checklist to ensure the operational 
hazard controls were properly implemented.
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (Spring 1975): 
Service Module Inspection
The later Apollo missions had a scientific instrument 
bay in the SM for conducting experiments in lunar 
orbit. Some experiments had booms extending out into 
space, and limit switches indicated whether the boom 
had been retracted far enough away to fire the SPS 
engine without that boom coming back and colliding 
with the SM. On one of those missions the limit 
switches were not sensing properly, which was found 
to be an installation problem and was later corrected.  
When I was working on the ASTP doing the wiring 
inspection for the SM scientific instrument bay at 
the North American Aviation, Inc. plant at Downey, 
California, I was looking carefully at those same limit 
switches because of the problem that occurred on 
the Apollo mission.  I noticed that the little lever arm 
that’s supposed to trip the switch was not making good 
contact with the boom piece, so I flagged that during 
the walk-around inspection. Then we checked to see 
how that issue had been missed. The quality team 
always inspected the vehicle to make sure it was built 
per the installation drawing, and it turned out that this 
was indeed per the installation drawing. 
The explanation was the long time lag between the 
last Apollo flight, Apollo 17 in 1972, and ASTP in 1975. 
In response to the limit switch problem during the 
Apollo mission, an engineering order was attached 
to the drawing to correct the limit switch instillation, 
instead of changing the actual drawing, which was 
more expensive. Often, many engineering orders 
were attached to a drawing.  When those installation 
drawings were taken from the files to be used in ASTP, 
the engineering orders were not included. 
The quality assurance personnel could only verify 
that the installation matched the drawing, not that it 
matched the intended design.  However, the designer 
could see if the drawing was wrong. That was the 
beauty of both NASA and contractor design personnel 
performing vehicle inspections. After the Apollo 1 
fire, NASA required a “Management Walk-Around 
Inspection” of all spacecraft prior to shipment to KSC, 
and this continued in the Space Shuttle Program.
Lesson: Design drawings should be updated 
following a design change. Engineering orders 
(attachments which show a change to a design) 
should not be overused. When an older design 
is being used, ensure that all of the subsequent 
modifications and changes have been documented 
and included.
Also, involving personnel that participated in 
previous missions or investigating past lessons 
learned can help avoid the repetition of past mission 
anomalies. For critical systems, the designers 
should be able to inspect the installation, to make 
sure it accurately follows the intended design.
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Human factors must be considered when designing 
space systems, to allow crew members to safely and 
successfully accomplish the mission. Sometimes this 
involves the design of the human-hardware interface, 
such as clearly labeling switches, protecting them from 
accidental activation, or accounting for the physical 
limitations of a space suit. Other times it involves 
operational considerations, such as managing training 
schedules or eliminating distractions during critical 
mission activities. 
Apollo 10 (May 1969): Inadvertent Lunar 
Module Abort
Important mission objectives were to demonstrate the 
separation of the LM, fire the descent engines, and 
dock the LM, but a switch misconfiguration resulted 
in lunar lander control problems. During the LM last 
pass, within eight miles of the moon and prior to the 
jettison of the LM descent stage, the commander 
(while wearing a space suit) started to troubleshoot 
an electrical anomaly. The Abort Guidance System was 
inadvertently switched from “hold attitude” to “auto,” 
which caused the LM to look for the CSM and flip end 
over end.
The attitude indicator was going to the red zone 
and in danger of tumbling the inertial platform. The 
commander was able to grab the hand controller, 
switch to manual control, jettison the descent stage, 
control the LM ascent stage, and finally dock with the 
CSM.
Lesson: Several human factors contributed to the 
error:
• The crew member was distracted due to 
troubleshooting the LM electrical problem 
while involved in procedures for LM ascent/
descent separation.
• The crew member had limited reach and 
visibility when fully suited with helmet and 
gloves.
• A critical switch was unguarded and susceptible 
to accidental activation.
Skylab 4 (November 1973 – February 
1974): Loss of Control During Entry
On February 8, 1974 while preparing for entry, the crew 
inadvertently opened the Stabilization and Control 
System pitch and yaw circuit breakers instead of the 
SM Propulsion System pitch and yaw circuit breakers. 
The vehicle was in an apex-forward configuration for 
SM jettison. The commander attempted to orient the 
vehicle to the proper attitude for entry, heat shield 
forward. The control commands produced no effect 
due to the Stabilization and Control System being 
inadvertently unpowered, and the vehicle failed to 
change attitude. The crew switched to “manual RCS 
direct” and oriented the vehicle to the proper attitude. 
The inability to orient the heat shield forward would 
have caused the loss of the crew.
The crew members later stated that they had 
mistakenly pulled the wrong circuit breakers because 
both circuit breakers were located on the same panel 
with similar labeling. Also, they had not operated the 
CSM in three months, so the operations were not fresh 
in their minds.
Lesson: Good labeling and positioning of switches 
are important for mitigating crew error during 
high-activity periods. In this case, crew error 
caused a problem, but the crew members also 
saved themselves using a backup manual control 
system. Critical automatic functions should have a 
manual or unlike-redundancy backup.
Several human factors contributed to the error:
• Crew members were distracted while doing 
two things at once (troubleshooting the CM 
RCS system while involved in procedures for 
CM/SM separation).
• The crew was required to open circuit breakers 
at critical time for deadfacing power. Power 
deadface relays should have been designed to 
deadface all circuits. 
• Circuit breakers should be labeled clearly, so 
that one is not mistaken for another.  
• When all circuit breakers are located on the 
Human factors and crew error
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same panel, the chances of pulling the wrong 
one increase.
• Training and simulation should be repeated 
or reviewed to re-establish proficiency after a 
significant time has passed.  
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (July 1975): 
Second Docking and CM Entry
On the last day of the joint mission the Docking Module 
pilot took control of the spacecraft to perform the 
second docking between the two spacecraft. The Soyuz 
had a sunlit Earth behind it, which caused poor docking 
target visibility and washout of the optical alignment 
sight reticle. The Docking Module pilot continued with 
the docking, but after docking he inadvertently bumped 
the left Rotational Hand Controller, firing a roll thruster 
after contact, which caused both vehicles to oscillate 
for a short time, folding them toward one another. The 
joint docking mechanism could have been damaged 
and a catastrophic depressurization of the Soyuz could 
have occurred. The Russians said this impact reached 
the design limits of the Soyuz docking system. The MCC 
in Houston apologized for the mistake. 
A second issue occurred during entry and landing. 
Prior to the mission, a crew training and procedures 
engineer informed me, when I worked as the Sequential 
Subsystem Manager, that the commander, who had 
also commanded the Apollo 10 mission, had insisted 
that the checklist be the same as it was for Apollo 10 
with regard to arming the ELS. Previously the crews 
had been concerned that the guarded ELS logic switch 
might fail, arming the ELS prematurely. This was a 
single-point-failure concern during the first seconds of 
flight. After Apollo 10 a change was made to rewire the 
ELS switches to have series redundancy, eliminating the 
single-point-failure mode. The new procedure kept the 
pyros armed after CSM separation and had been used 
on several missions. This prevented a critical step from 
having to be performed during the later, time-critical 
period. 
The crew training and procedures engineer arranged for 
us to meet with the commander, so I could explain the 
changes to him. We also tried to convince him to keep 
the ELS in automatic mode and to let the parachutes 
be deployed automatically. The commander refused to 
change the entry procedure and insisted that the crew 
would not forget to deploy the parachutes. 
As the spacecraft was descending the crew got behind 
in the checklist, and the pyro buses were armed 20 
seconds late at 37,000 feet. At 30,000 feet the ELS auto 
system should have been turned on, but wasn’t, due 
to a miscommunication between the Docking Module 
pilot and CM pilot. 
At 24,000 feet the commander should have turned off 
the RCS, but didn’t, because he was waiting for the 
drogue parachutes to deploy. The drogue parachutes 
had not deployed because the auto ELS system wasn’t 
on. The CM pilot manually jettisoned the apex cover at 
19,700 feet and deployed the drogues at 18,550 feet. 
(The drogues should have deployed at 24,000 feet.) 
At 10,000 feet the commander realized that the auto 
ELS was not on, and turned it on, so that the main 
chutes deployed. The delay caused the main chutes 
to be deployed at 7,150 rather than 10,000 feet. The 
commander also disabled the RCS.
The RCS was disabled much later than the correct 
altitude of 24,000 feet, but the cabin pressure relief 
valve opened automatically and correctly at 24,500 
feet. During a 30-second period of high thruster 
activity after drogue parachute deployment, a mixture 
of air and propellant combustion products, water and 
nitrogen oxide, were sucked into the cabin. This would 
have been avoided if the RCS had been switched off at 
the correct time. 
At about 16,000 feet the commander closed the RCS 
propellant isolation valves, per the checklist. Closure 
of the propellant isolation valves allowed the toxic 
nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer trapped between the valves 
and the thrusters to boil off as the thrusters operated 
for 23 additional seconds before the RCS was inhibited 
by the operation of the RCS disable relay at an altitude 
of about 9,600 feet. The toxic nitrogen tetroxide vapors 
trapped between the propellant isolation valves and 
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the solenoid valves were sucked into the cabin. 
One of the positive roll thrusters was two feet away 
from the steam vent through which outside air was 
pulled into the CM close to the CM pilot. This exposed 
the crew to a high level of nitrogen tetroxide, since 
emergency oxygen masks were not available until 
landing. The CM pilot passed out, but revived when the 
commander put an oxygen mask on him after landing. 
The exposure resulted in a two-week hospital stay for 
the crew. 
Lesson: Crew training should include human 
factors awareness. In the docking event, the crew 
member didn’t take his own human limitations 
into account when he attempted to dock without 
having adequate visibility. 
Crew training should reflect the current vehicle 
configuration and the latest crew procedures. In 
the entry event, the crew didn’t correctly follow the 
entry procedure because the commander wanted 
to use the old procedure he knew instead of the 
updated procedure. He also ignored the advice of 
the engineers to enable the automatic system. This 
resulted in errors which endangered the crew.
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As analysis and modeling techniques have improved, 
spaceflight programs have tended to rely more and 
more on this less expensive approach, as opposed 
to the more expensive process of testing. However, 
because of the unknown space environment testing is 
required to confirm the analysis and models.
It is important to understand the flight environment 
and to test flight hardware to that environment 
whenever possible. The qualification test configuration 
should be the same as the flight configuration. Ground 
testing personnel should be available to support critical 
mission phases in real time, especially for missions 
beyond Earth orbit.
Apollo 7 (October 1968): Electrical Short
During the Apollo 7 mission, the first flight after the 
Apollo 1 fire, while on orbit during a loss of signal, 
the AC bus 1 and 2 momentarily shorted out, causing 
automatic disconnect of the AC inverters. The AC 
power loss turned off the internal panel lights and 
all AC-powered equipment (pumps and fans). The 
short was associated with the cryogenic oxygen tank 
fans being automatically switched off by the pressure 
switches. The crew turned the automatic system off. 
Post-flight analysis identified the SM motor switches 
used to switch the three-phase 115-volt AC power 
as the source of the short. The motor switches were 
only environmentally sealed, not hermetically sealed, 
and were not sufficiently tested for the vacuum 
environment. While exposed to vacuum, a leak in the 
environmental seal caused the pressure to drop to the 
threshold for corona arcing, causing the shorting of AC 
power.   
Lesson: The flight environment must be thoroughly 
understood, and flight hardware should be tested 
according to that environment as much as possible. 
Electrical switching components exposed to 
vacuum should be hermetically sealed to prevent 
shorting due to corona. 
Apollo 16 (1972): Lunar Rover Anomalies
During Apollo 16 multiple, intermittent battery 
instrument anomalies occurred during Lunar Rover 
Vehicle (LRV) operation in the low-temperature 
environment on the moon. The Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC) Director asked the JSC MER 
to independently investigate the cause of the LRV 
problems, since MSFC’s investigation board had not 
identified a cause.  
I was working as the Sequential Subsystem Manager, 
and my investigation of the grounding circuitry revealed 
that the small 22-gauge return wires to the meters and 
ampere-hour integrator were crimp spliced with the 
large 12-gauge battery return wire (total of five wires in 
the splice). An open circuit to ground and power return 
would explain the anomalies seen in flight.  
The number of these return wires and the size 
difference exceeded the JSC spacecraft requirements 
on the splicing of different gauge wires in a single splice, 
as large differences can result in a loose connection on 
some of the small-gauge wires. The investigation also 
revealed that the qualification LRV that was tested in a 
thermal vacuum chamber had solder connections, not 
the crimp splices as used on the LRVs.      
Lesson:  The vehicle’s qualification test configuration 
should be the same as the flight configuration, even 
for small things like wire splices, because changes 
that seem small on the ground can have significant 
unforeseen consequences in a flight environment.
Apollo 16 (April 1972): Delayed Lunar 
Descent
After Lunar Orbit Insertion the LM undocked from 
the CSM in preparation for starting the lunar descent. 
The CSM performed system checks of the primary 
and secondary SPS pitch and yaw gimbal actuators 
in preparation to perform the circularization burn. 
Oscillations were detected in the secondary yaw 
gimbal actuator. Proper operation of both primary 
and secondary were required for the mission to 
continue with a lunar landing. The LM crew was told 
to go back and stay in close proximity to the CSM while 
Test as you fly, fly as you test, and the value 
of real-time testing
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troubleshooting was performed on the secondary yaw 
actuator. The LM would need to be docked to the CSM 
if the primary SPS gimbal actuator failed, in order to 
return to Earth from lunar orbit.  
Tests and analysis showed that the redundant system 
was still usable and safe, had it been required for an 
SPS engine burn. Therefore, the LM was given a go to 
proceed with the powered lunar descent and landing 
after a six-hour delay.
Lesson: Having personnel from design, test, and 
operations available to support flight operations 
can be beneficial. In this case, engineering analysis 
and testing could be performed in real time to 
enable the mission to continue.
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The political interests of NASA centers can motivate 
decisions that are in the best interests of the center, 
but not in the best interests of the overall design or 
of safety.  A spacecraft contractor that wants to use a 
particular hardware subcontractor may work to show 
that its hardware is the best, even if the customer has 
a cost concern about that subcontract, and even when 
it compromises the overall systems design and safety. 
The following examples from the early development 
and design of the space shuttle illustrate this problem. 
Space Shuttle Main Engine Electrical Design
Why was the orbiter designed for 117 volts AC power 
instead of the aerospace standard of 115 volts?
The Power Distribution and Control Branch in the 
Control Systems Development Division was responsible 
for the AC power and distribution for the orbiter being 
developed by Rockwell Space Division. As a redundancy 
improvement over Apollo, the AC inverter would be 
single phase 115 volts, using three inverters to power a 
three-phase AC bus. The vendor’s design was similar to 
the design used in commercial aviation. After the design 
was well underway, we were informed that the MSFC 
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) controllers under 
contract were designed to receive 115 volt, three-
phase AC power. This was because the SSME contracts 
were awarded early when the proposed orbiter design 
called for AC generators in the aft to provide electrical 
power. Later when the orbiter contract was awarded, 
the design removed the AC generators and electrical 
DC power was provided by fuel cells.  
We informed MSFC that the power in the aft 
compartment would be DC power.  MSFC did not want 
to change the SSME controller design, due to cost and 
schedule, and insisted on receiving AC power, rather 
than the DC power located in the aft compartment. I 
don’t know the actual figures, but I suspect the SSME 
controller cost and schedule change was greater 
than the cost and schedule change to the orbiter AC 
inverter. It was probably the correct decision for cost 
and schedule, but looking at it from an integrated 
power distribution design standpoint, the DC power 
would have been a more reliable power source and 
lower safety risk.  
Rockwell had to change the inverter design to provide 
the non-aerospace standard 117 volts, which was 
required because of the two-volt line drop from the 
forward compartment AC bus to the SSME controllers. 
All AC powered equipment in the orbiter had to change 
to accept 117 volts instead of the standard 115 volts. 
This was a less reliable source of power for the SSME 
controller due to the three small-gauge wires, long 
wire run with many connectors (forward avionics bay 
to aft compartment SSME controller), and need for 
each phase to be protected by a three-ampere circuit 
breaker. This compares to a design of two wires (power 
and return) from the aft avionics bay to the SSME 
controller. Electrical DC power to the aft avionics bay 
from the forward distribution assembly was via two 
very large-gauge wires, each protected by 200 ampere 
fuse. During ascent on STS-93 a short on AC bus 1 
phase A caused the loss of SSME 1 Controller A and 
SSME 3 Controller B. 
Lesson: NASA centers tend to compete with each 
other, and may not want to take each other’s 
advice, especially if it involves redoing work. These 
factors may influence spacecraft design. Also, this 
example shows cost and schedule considerations 
taking precedence over design and safety.
To avoid this situation, NASA Headquarters would 
have to review both centers’ proposals and insist 
on the design with less safety risk. This would be 
challenging to implement.
Space Shuttle Avionics Computers
Why were the computers air cooled, while the avionics 
were on cold plates?
In the orbiter contract Rockwell had stated that IBM 
would provide the orbiter avionics computers. IBM 
was very expensive compared to the other bidders for 
the orbiter computers, but told NASA these would be 
the flight-proven IBM computers flying on the B-52s. 
The B-52 computers were air cooled, like all aircraft 
Politics is the enemy of good design
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avionics. The orbiter avionics were on cold plates, which 
would not be affected if the orbiter crew cabin became 
depressurized, but because the IBM computers were 
the less efficient air-cooled design, they would fail if 
the cabin were depressurized. Also, the air inlet filters 
had to be periodically cleaned. IBM’s orbiter computer 
design was nothing like its aircraft computers, so the 
argument that the design was flight proven was no 
longer valid.
After the shuttle had been flying for several years, 
NASA considered converting the computers to a cold 
plate design, which would involve removing the air 
ducts and adding cold plates, but the idea was rejected 
as too expensive.
Lesson: Contractors’ business interests may 
influence design decisions, with detrimental 
effects. Also, either the hazard analysis in this 
situation was insufficient or the additional risks 
posed by the IBM design were not sufficiently 
communicated, resulting in a poor design decision.
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Manual crew control as a backup for automated 
systems has the potential to save the crew and/or 
mission when in-flight anomalies occur. However, the 
addition of manual crew control capabilities comes at 
the expense of budget and schedule and can introduce 
new risks associated with potential human error. Risk 
benefit trades must be performed to determine what 
types of manual crew control capabilities should be 
incorporated into new spacecraft designs to mitigate 
risks to flight crew and mission success while staying 
within programmatic constraints.
On the Apollo spacecraft, backup capability was 
provided for crew safety functions, even if the system 
provided a level of unlike redundancy.  This saved the 
crew and the mission on several occasions.
Manual backup controls saved the LM crew on Apollo 
10 (see “Redundancy can help or hinder”). Later, the 
Apollo 12 crew manually reset an automatic function 
to save the mission. Crew members used power from 
the battery relay bus to reconnect the fuel cells to Main 
Bus A and B and reconnect the inverters to AC Bus 1 
and 2 (see “Redundancy can help or hinder”). 
Manual backup to automatic control also saved the 
crew on Skylab 4. The commander switched to manual 
control, so he could maneuver the spacecraft to the 
proper entry attitude (see “Human factors and crew 
error”).
Manual backup to the automatic redundant Earth 
Landing System saved the crew on ASTP when the apex 
cover had to be jettisoned manually so that the drogue 
parachutes would deploy (see “Human factors and 
crew error”).
Lesson: Critical automatic functions should have a 
manual or unlike-redundancy backup.
Figure 1 summarizes the history of manual control. 
It shows the systems on each vehicle which provided 
manual control, whether those systems were used, and 
whether they were used during nominal operations or 
a contingency event.
Automatic versus manual control
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Figure 1. History of the Use of Manual Control
(Source: History of Manual Crew Override, page 2)
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Table 1:  Summary of Manual Control Capabilities, by Program 
 
 
 
Program
Capability
Mercury Gemini Apollo SpaceShuttle Soyuz
Abort Initiation X
Abort Inhibit X X
Manual Steering X X X
Manual Throttling and 
Shutdown X X X
Abort Initiation
Attitude Control
Pre-launch/Ascent
Translation Burns
Rendezvous
Abort Inititation
Abort Inhibit
Attitude Control
Translation Burn
Attitude Control
Parachute
Deployment X
Landing Gear 
Deployment
Runway Steering
On Orbit
Lunar Descent/
Ascent
Entry/Landing
Manual capability was provided
N - used for nominal operations
C - used in a contingency event
Manual capability was NOT provided
Capability not applicable to the program
C
N
C
N
C
C
C
CCC
C
N
N
N
N N
(drag chute)
(2nd & 3rd stage)
(3rd stage)
(post MET 1:30)
C
C
N
C
N
C
N
C
N
N N N
N C
X
Docking/Undocking N N C
N
C
N
C
C
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During a problem investigation, try to inspect the 
actual hardware involved, if possible. If the problem 
is electrical noise or electromagnetic interference, 
remember to investigate the grounding system first. If 
the electrical problem occurs on unrelated hardware, 
the ground system is often common, and that is the 
first place to investigate. (In addition to the following 
examples, also see the LRV incident in the section “Test 
as you fly, fly as you test, and the value of real-time 
testing.”)
Apollo 4 (1967): Launch Pad 
Instrumentation Electrical Noise
Apollo 4 was the first uncrewed test flight of the 
Saturn V launch vehicle. Apollo 4 was an “all-up” test, 
meaning all rocket stages and spacecraft were fully 
functional on the initial flight. The mission objective 
was to demonstrate structural and thermal integrity 
and compatibility of launch vehicle and spacecraft, as 
well as to test the adequacy of the Block II command 
module heatshield design for lunar return entry 
conditions. 
When Apollo 4 first arrived at the pad at KSC for testing 
and checkout, the Apollo spacecraft personnel observed 
a lot of electrical noise on their instrumentation 
system. After a lot of work, they still couldn’t figure out 
what was wrong, so they asked the MSC MER Manager 
to send a team to help determine what the problem 
was. I was on this team, since I always worked on the 
electrical system. I began with looking at the drawings 
and saw that the spacecraft was well designed, in the 
sense that it had an “I ground” for the grounding of 
all low-level instrumentation. It had an “E ground” 
for the grounding all electrical power, and both were 
separated from each other. According to the drawings, 
this system would be isolated all the way down to the 
base of the Saturn V and the mobile launcher, where 
they would be tied together. 
In the mobile launcher the two grounds, electrical 
power return “E” and instrumentation “I,” were 
tied together to go to the main ground to make sure 
everything was grounded. I went over the drawings and 
met with the KSC engineer, then we started at the top 
and walked down the grounds, opening up the various 
junction boxes. When I got all the way down to the 
base, which was in a closed compartment underneath 
the mobile crawler, and opened up the junction box, 
a link was missing between the “E” and “I” ground. 
The “E” ground, the power return, was grounded. 
The “I” ground was floating. It wasn’t connected to 
the “E” ground, and the link to tie them together was 
missing. That immediately explained the noise on the 
instrumentation system. Thankfully it was an easy fix, 
and the testing of the spacecraft and launch vehicle 
could continue. 
Lesson: Physical hardware, as well as design 
drawings, should be inspected during problem 
investigations. This area is often overlooked. 
When there is electrical noise in the electrical/
instrumentation system, the first step is to look at 
the grounding/power return design and inspect 
the hardware.  
Mars Viking Test (1975): Test Stand 
Instrumentation Electrical Noise
While the Mars Viking Landers 1 and 2 were undergoing 
testing at the Martin Denver facility prior to shipment to 
KSC for launch processing, an electrical noise problem 
occurred that the engineering and test personnel were 
unable to isolate and fix. The NASA JSC Manager of the 
Programs Operations Office responsible for the MER 
received a call from JSC Director Kraft’s office to go to 
Denver to help solve the problem, and I was on this 
team. 
We were briefed by the Viking Program’s engineering 
personnel and given the drawings/schematics of 
the test stand electrical and grounding system. This 
sounded very much like the Saturn V spacecraft 
electrical noise problem we had investigated before, 
so I first looked at the grounding drawings and noted 
they had an “E ground” for electrical power return and 
an “I ground” for the instrumentation, a good design. 
I went to the test stand with a Martin test electrical 
engineer to physically inspect the E and I grounds. They 
Drawings help, but remember to inspect 
actual hardware
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consisted of two large cables that came down the test 
stand and went outside the building. 
The facility is located on the side of a mountain, and the 
climate is very dry, so a water well was used to provide 
a good ground. Both cables went down this well, and 
I asked for the cover to be removed. Using a flashlight 
that I shined down the well, I could see water at the 
bottom. I asked the engineer to wiggle the cables, and 
the water did not move. That was the source of the 
problem: both the E and I grounds were floating, acting 
like antennas picking up electromagnetic interference. 
The solution was to add water to the well and add a 
step in the test checklist to verify that the cables were 
in the water. They thanked us, but were embarrassed 
that such a simple fix solved their problem.
Lesson: As in the previous example, drawings 
are often examined for issues in the design, 
but checks of the installation or setup are often 
overlooked. Any time you have electrical noise in 
the electrical/instrumentation system, first look 
at the grounding/power return design. Don’t just 
look at drawings; physically examine the setup to 
make sure everything is in place. 
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Hazard analysis was not routinely performed during 
the Apollo Program and was not fully accepted in 
the broader NASA community until the Challenger 
accident. Engineering safety hazard analysis should not 
only be performed for flight systems, but also for critical 
spacecraft ground tests. Also, the hazard analysis 
should be repeated when there is a subsequent design 
change. Pessimistic thinking can help reveal risk areas 
and motivate preparations for emergencies.
Apollo Mission A-003 (1965): Little Joe II 
Booster Fin Failure
Apollo Mission A-003 used a boilerplate spacecraft 
(BP-22) launched from Launch Complex 36 at White 
Sands Missile Range on May 19, 1965. The mission 
was a high-altitude test of the abort system, and the 
Little Joe II had six Algol solid rocket motors, making 
this the largest solid rocket motor launch at that time. 
Concern about the reliability of the abort signal from 
the launch vehicle led to using a loss of signal/open 
circuit rather than an electrical signal being sent. Three 
abort signals were to be sent in two-of-three voting in 
the spacecraft sequencer to initiate the abort. A radio 
frequency command was sent to the launch vehicle for 
the abort, which powered a relay opening the normally 
closed contacts, causing loss of signal to the spacecraft.
Shortly after liftoff one of the Little Joe fins failed hard-
over, and the faster it went forward. the faster it spun 
around till centrifugal force caused the launch vehicle 
to structurally fail approximately 25 seconds after 
liftoff. The launch vehicle breakup caused the open 
circuit/loss of signal, and the spacecraft sequencer 
initiated an automatic abort of the BP-22 spacecraft. 
The spacecraft separated from the launch vehicle at 
a high roll rate. The drogue chute had steel cables as 
risers, which was beneficial, since the spacecraft upper 
deck was damaged from the risers lashing around in 
the process of damping out the roll rate. The lower 
part of the main risers had a fine steel overwrap. 
Concern about spacecraft dynamics during parachute 
deployment causing damage to the parachute risers 
from upper deck sharp edges resulted in the changes 
to the parachute risers.   
The abort command from the launch vehicle 
implemented as an open circuit allowed this signal 
to also be an indication of launch vehicle structural 
integrity. This concept was carried forward to the 
Saturn 1B and the Saturn V launchers. The three 
Emergency Detection System abort circuits to the CM 
were routed 120 degrees apart along the inside of 
the outer structure, with open circuit being the abort 
command. Two out of three of the circuits being open 
would initiate an automatic abort. The change to steel 
cables for the drogue chute risers is probably the 
reason the spacecraft was safely recovered.
Lesson: Engineering safety analysis should indicate 
what the abort signal to spacecraft should be if the 
launch vehicle structurally fails. Parachute risers 
should be designed for the worst case environment.
Apollo-Saturn Mission 201 (February 
1966): Loss of Reaction Control System
After CSM separation, entry heating led to an electrical 
short, causing the RCS commands to be transferred 
from the CM to the SM, resulting in the loss of RCS 
control. After the loss of the RCS the CM went into 
a stable roll and did a ballistic entry instead of the 
planned lifting re-entry.
The cause of all this was a non-functional circuit 
(Criticality 3) that was routed through the CSM 
umbilical that was not deadfaced prior to separation, 
and it was powered from the Sequential Events Control 
Subsystem System B circuit breaker, causing loss of the 
redundant Earth Landing System (Criticality 1).  The 
non-functional circuit had been dropped from the 
drawings, but the wiring was left in the spacecraft and 
was not disconnected from power.  Since it was not on 
the drawing for the powered wiring going through the 
CSM umbilical, it was not deadfaced prior to guillotine 
of the umbilical. The redundant Earth Landing System 
allowed for recovery of the CM.
Lesson: Hazard analysis should be performed on 
critical systems. All non-functional circuits, if left 
in the spacecraft, should be disconnected from 
Hazard analysis is critical
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both power and return and should be identified on 
spacecraft drawings. Careful review should ensure 
all powered wiring through an umbilical to be 
guillotined is deadfaced prior to cutting with the 
guillotine.  
Also, Criticality 3 functions (which are not essential 
for crew or vehicle survival) should not be allowed 
to affect Criticality 1 functions (which are essential 
for the operation of the vehicle and/or the survival 
of the crew).
Apollo Environmental Control System (April 
1966): Fire During Test
See the full summary of this event in “Documenting 
and sharing information: communication is key.” 
The hardware used in the test had undergone no 
engineering analysis to show it was compatible with the 
test environment. Hazard analysis would probably have 
revealed that the commercial heater tape insulation 
could not withstand the temperature to which it would 
be exposed.
Lesson: Hazard analysis should be performed on 
critical test configurations. The compatibility of 
materials with the environment (temperatures 
and pure oxygen exposure) must be assessed. This 
error should have led to greater awareness of this 
issue, but similar problems occurred the following 
year during the Apollo 1 fire.
Apollo 1 (January 1967): Fire and Loss of 
Crew
At 6:31 pm on Friday, January 27, 1967 at KSC during 
a simulated countdown for the AS-204 mission, a fire 
broke out in the CM and quickly caused the loss of the 
crew, Virgil Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee. I was 
in the JSC MCC on the Electrical Power System Console 
in the Staff Support Room alongside my flight controller 
counterpart monitoring the test at KSC. The test was 
running long due to numerous problems. Because the 
MCC was just monitoring the test being run from KSC, 
after 5:00 pm the flight control personnel in the Staff 
Support Room left for the day. I and the North American 
Space and Information Systems flight controller on the 
Environmental Control Systems Console were the only 
ones left.  
We heard the scream of fire on the headset and 
the KSC personnel trying to get to the CM. Ground 
personnel grabbed the available gas masks, but passed 
out after entering the smoke-filled White Room 
around the CM, because the masks were for filtering 
hypergolic propellant fumes and were not closed, 
oxygen-providing masks. I was hopeful, thinking the 
crew members were in their spacesuits and would be 
okay, but I heard the KSC test conductor on the headset 
tell Dr. Christopher Kraft to go to a private phone. My 
heart sank, as I knew it meant the crew didn’t survive. 
Dr. Kraft was monitoring the test at the Flight Director 
Console in the Mission Operations Control Room. He 
then announced on the Flight Director loop to lock 
the doors, that no one was to leave, and that we were 
allowed one call to our spouse to say we would not be 
home, but not to say anything else.  He later came back 
to the Staff Support Room and told us they would be 
playing back the data and to concentrate on reviewing 
it. 
I had noticed at about the time of the report of fire 
that we had a short on Main DC Bus A and B. That 
indicated that the short must have a load connected 
to both main DC buses. The following day I went over 
all the schematics to identify the wires dioded to both 
main buses. The next week I was asked to go to KSC 
for the investigation. I was assigned, along with a 
photographer, to go through the wiring in the CM to 
identify the ignition source.     
A significant part of the left-hand lower equipment 
bay was gone (metal, plumbing, wiring, etc.). This was 
where the fire started and was the hottest, because the 
most oxygen was present. The most probable initiator 
was an electrical arc occurring near the floor in the 
lower forward section of the bay. Here, instrumentation 
power from a Teflon-insulated wire powered by Main 
Bus A and B was routed over metal plumbing and under 
a coolant control access panel, just below the left crew 
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couch. 
The wire harness, a twisted pair of wires, and power 
and power return had an extra Teflon overwrap 
for protection from the panel door and the metal 
plumbing. However, the last closeout photo of that 
area before the fire showed that the extra Teflon wrap 
had slipped down, and was not keeping the wire away 
from the plumbing. The wire harness had no extra 
protection from the panel door opening/closing or 
from ground test personnel or crew at the time of the 
test. The wire looked like it was touching the bottom of 
the panel door. 
Spacecraft movement was noted during the test, as the 
commander was reconnecting the communications 
cable, and the damage could have happened at this 
time. A simulation showed that he would have had to 
put his foot down, off the crew couch, to reconnect the 
cable, and would have placed his foot near this wire. 
The crew cabin was pressurized to 16.7 psi with pure 
oxygen. The side hatch consisted of a two-piece, inward 
opening (pressure sealing) hatch. The fire increased the 
pressure, which made the hatch more difficult to open, 
so the crew was unable to open the hatch to escape. It 
took 90 seconds to remove the hatch from the outside 
and get them out.    
No engineering safety hazard analysis was performed 
on the ground test configuration. If performed, it 
probably would have identified that the materials 
inside the cabin were not certified for the environment 
and that no protective gear or training was available for 
fighting a fire on the spacecraft level at the launch pad.
Lesson: Hazard analysis should be performed on 
critical test configurations. All tests at 100% oxygen 
should be defined as hazardous. Emergency 
training should be required for all test support 
personnel, and test areas should be equipped 
with appropriate emergency, fire-fighting, or 
rescue equipment. The selection and placement of 
materials inside the spacecraft must be compatible 
with the spacecraft environment. The crew ingress/
egress hatch should be a single, outward-opening 
hatch requiring only five seconds to open. 
Apollo 13 (April 1970): Oxygen Tank 
Explosion
See the full incident summary in the section “Expect the 
unexpected and never stop learning.” The thermostatic 
switches were rated for 30 volts DC, but several years 
earlier the heater ground power supply voltage was 
raised to 65 volts to reduce the pressurization time. 
As the temperature increased, the thermostatic switch 
opened and the higher voltage caused the contacts 
to weld closed. No engineering safety hazard analysis 
of the voltage change to the thermostatic switch was 
performed. 
Lesson: Hazard analysis should be repeated 
following a design change.
Skylab 3 (July 1973): Propellant Leak and 
Rescue Mission
See the full incident summary in the section 
“Redundancy can help or hinder.”
Lesson: Hazard analysis should be performed on 
redundant systems, to ensure they provide the 
expected redundancy. Had the analysis been 
performed, it would have revealed that a system 
that appeared to be single-fault tolerant was 
actually zero-fault tolerant in effect, because the 
backup system would not work. 
The programs’ early planning to develop a Skylab 
rescue capability is what allowed a rescue mission 
to be developed so quickly. This is a good example 
of reaping the benefits of planning ahead for 
something to go wrong.
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In July of 1982, Congress mandated a Shuttle/Centaur 
Program to launch Galileo and Ulysses satellites by May 
of 1986 and subsequently to collaborate with the U.S. 
Air Force for Department of Defense (DOD) missions. In 
order to pair these two existing programs, the shuttle 
propellant fill/drain/dump system had to be modified. 
The Centaur also required multiple design changes 
to integrate with the shuttle payload bay, including 
modifications of the tank, the fill/drain/dump system, 
the integrated support system, and software updates.
I became the Deputy Director of SR&QA in October 
1985. In November a senior safety engineer informed 
me of significant safety concerns about the Shuttle/
Centaur Program, which no one in management had 
addressed. One concern was the tank and propellant 
systems not meeting the required factors of safety. 
Another was the overpressuriztion of the liquid oxygen 
system from excessive surge pressure, such as a water 
hammer effect from liquid oxygen loading termination.
The Space Shuttle Program Payload Safety Panel 
Chairman had disapproved the Shuttle/Centaur payload 
non-compliance reports, but that the decision was 
overturned by NASA Headquarters after an appeal by 
the NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC). Other safety-
critical, single-point failures existed in this program as 
well, with credible concerns as to the reliability of the 
system.
In preparation for the Shuttle/Centaur Program Level 
1 (NASA Headquarters) Review on January 16, 1986 
at KSC, I wrote a memorandum to the manager of the 
National Space Transportation System regarding the 
JSC SR&QA position on Centaur.4 This memorandum 
outlined multiple safety problems that SR&QA believed 
needed to be resolved prior to the first Centaur flight 
scheduled approximately four months later.
At the Level 1 Program Review I presented the JSC 
SR&QA position, and the NASA Headquarters Head 
of Human Spaceflight directed me to coordinate with 
LeRC. This was discouraging, since JSC SR&QA and the 
Payload Safety Panel had been working with LeRC with 
4 Memorandum NA/86-M007
no agreement to correct the safety non-compliance 
reports. 
In early January 1986 the commander for one of the 
Centaur missions, Rick Hauck, was working on an issue 
with redundancy in the helium actuation system for the 
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen dump valves. Hauck 
believed that the program was willing to compromise 
on the margins in the propulsive force being provided 
by the pressurized helium, which concerned him 
enough that he raised the issue with the Chief of the 
Astronaut Office, John Young. “John Young called this 
mission, ‘Death Star’” recalled Hauck. “That was his 
name for this mission, which he said with humor, but 
behind humor, there’s a little bit of truth. I think it was 
conceded this was going to be the riskiest mission the 
shuttle would have flown up to that point.”5
John Young and Rick Hauck “went to a board [Space 
Shuttle Program Control Board] to argue why this 
was not a good idea to compromise on [the helium 
actuation system], and the board turned down the 
request.” Back in the Crew Office, Hauck told the other 
crew members, “NASA is doing business different 
from the way it was done in the past. Safety is being 
compromised, and if any of you want to take yourself 
off this flight, I will support you.”6
On January 28, 1986 the Challenger disaster occurred. I 
was surprised and disappointed that the next scheduled 
mission, this “Death Star,” with all of the open safety 
concerns was delayed but not canceled. At a Payload 
Safety Review Panel meeting, more safety concerns 
were raised. LeRC stated that a redesign would create 
schedule problems that NASA Headquarters would 
have to direct.7 
In March I conducted an SR&QA audit of the safety-
critical avionics. Significant findings included:
• Acceptance testing without released test 
procedure.
• Automatic test equipment used on checkout often 
5 Frederick H. Hauck Oral History Interviews
6 Ibid.
7 Documented in memorandum NA/86-M035
Killing “Death Star:” be persistent in 
advocating for safety
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indicated “Test Passed” when parameters were out 
of limits.
• Control unit tested on unreleased software.
• Critical avionics box certified for flight with open 
failures and wavers.
When I asked the responsible engineer why he signed 
off on the flight certification with open failures, he said 
his manager directed him to sign. LeRC told me this was 
not true. I did not mention this in my written report, 
because I did not want the engineer to be disciplined 
for what he conveyed to me in private. 
On March 4 John Young wrote to the Centaur mission 
commanders Rick Hauck and Dave Walker about the 
Centaur mission. The handwritten note said, “But 
also never forget that: a. Running the pressure up & 
down during ascent, b. Venting H2 during ascent, c. 
pressurized stabilized pressure vessels, d. spot-welded 
pressurized propellant tanks are not good ideas...
Please do NOT invite me to any more briefings on 
Centaur. The engineering logic in them makes my head 
hurt.”8 Despite this sentiment, Hauck reported that 
John Young would ask him about the “Death Star” at 
the Monday morning status meetings.
On April 8 three members of the House Appropriations 
Committee Surveys Investigation Staff met with me 
regarding Centaur safety concerns. They asked me 
questions about my audit results and the problems I 
had reported.9 They also requested copies of the other 
two memos, documenting the SR&QA position and the 
concerns raised at the Level 1 Program Review at KSC.  
The JSC Engineering Propulsion and Power Division 
Systems Branch Deputy Chief had concerns about 
Centaur’s compatibility with the shuttle. He believed 
that the inherent Centaur design, with common 
bulkhead pressure-stabilized tanks combined with 
a highly active cryogenic vent and pressurized duty 
cycle, did not meet human spacecraft standards and 
8 Handwritten notes on memorandum DA8-86-44
9 Memorandum NA/86-M052 documented the audit 
results
represented an undue hazard to the shuttle.10
On May 22, 1986 Rick Hauck presented the concerns 
to management, that even after the proposed safety 
modifications had been implemented, the Shuttle/
Centaur flight still represented significant additional 
risk to the orbiter and crew. Attempts to integrate 
an uncrewed upper stage into the shuttle resulted 
in compromises which created undue risk, and the 
ability to reduce the risks to an acceptable level was 
questionable.11
On June 6, 1986 a draft of a Shuttle/Centaur presentation 
destined for the NASA Administrator was reviewed in a 
meeting chaired by the Space Shuttle Program Office 
(Level 2) at JSC with personnel from Headquarters, 
LeRC, KSC, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.12 The 
briefing highlighted two significant hazards: 
• Loss of pressure control of oxygen or hydrogen 
tanks. (This would be a catastrophic failure, and 
end-to-end pressure control could not be verified 
by testing.)
• Rupture of lines/components due to pressure 
surges during normal system transients, and 
pressure surges due to system malfunction or 
inadvertent operations not included in design 
requirements. 
The presentation concluded that even with the best 
possible solutions, Centaur represented significant 
additional risks to the shuttle. This was the JSC position, 
not LeRC’s position, and the word “significant” was 
ultimately deleted. The safety assessment stated, “No 
technical barriers have been identified which prevent 
Centaur integration into [the shuttle] with minimal 
additive risk.” I spoke up to say that this was not safety’s 
position, but the chart was not changed. 
On June 13, 1986 NASA Headquarters sent out 
this Shuttle/Centaur presentation for review and 
comment, in preparation for its presentation to the 
10 Documented in memorandum EP2-86-M55.
11 Rick Hauck, “Centaur Risk”
12 Draft of “Shuttle/Centaur Presentation to the 
Administrator”
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NASA Administrator on June 19. I recommended 
adding the wording “tank rupture hazard increased 
during dumps.” Regarding tank pressure control, I 
added “end-to-end pressure control is highly sensitive 
to assumptions regarding fluid dynamics which cannot 
be test verified.” On the summary chart I added, 
“additive safety risks are inherent to Centaur, cannot 
be eliminated, and represent significant increase over 
that accepted for previous payloads.” None of my 
comments were incorporated into the presentation. 
On June 16 a telecon was held with NASA Headquarters 
regarding Centaur. I wrote a memo to document that I 
had communicated the JSC SR&QA position that “even 
if all the proposed safety modifications are made...the 
program must accept a safety risk greater than any 
previous shuttle payload and most shuttle systems...
The overall position of this office is not to fly Centaur 
on the space shuttle.”13 
On June 19, 1986 the revised charts were presented to 
the NASA Administrator, and I attended this meeting 
sitting next to Commander Rick Hauck. At the meeting 
DOD, LeRC, the JSC Engineering Propulsion and Power 
Division Chief, and planetary representatives favored 
continuing Shuttle/Centaur, but I stated that the risk 
was too high. Many arguments were made under much 
scrutiny, but I held my position regarding the safety 
hazards. The astronauts also expressed concerns, but 
were somewhat resolved to flying the mission. The 
Administrator left to have a separate, closed-door 
meeting. I felt very discouraged, as it seemed the 
program would continue, based on the presentation 
and the position of the other organizations. 
Later that day I learned that the Administrator had 
canceled the program. That made my day! Hard work 
and persistence had paid off.  
Lesson: If you believe something is unsafe, be 
persistent in reporting your concerns, again and 
again if necessary. Advocating for the cancellation 
of this program was an extraordinarily difficult 
task that faced considerable opposition. Even 
13 Memorandum NA/86-M082
with the recent loss of Challenger, significant 
safety hazards were not receiving enough 
attention, influenced in part by schedule pressure. 
Although other organizations had concerns with 
the Shuttle/Centaur Program (Payload Safety 
Panel, Engineering, Crew Office), I as the SR&QA 
representative voiced opposition to the mission at 
the Administrator’s review.
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When working with Russian partners, cultural 
differences, approaches to education, the value placed 
on experience, the willingness to accept different paths 
to a common goal, and differences in design philosophy 
are all important in communicating well and developing 
trust. One cultural difference is that Russians believe 
it’s bad luck to shake hands in a doorway. Another is 
that even numbers are bad luck; for example, flowers 
should always be given in odd numbers. Knowing 
these small things can make relationships with any 
international partners go more smoothly.
Knowing the differences in U.S. and Russian educational 
systems can help minimize misunderstandings. The 
U.S. education system emphasizes reading, writing, 
and written responses in tests. In contrast, the Russian 
system focuses more on auditory learning with lectures 
and oral exams. As a result, most Americans learn to 
write things down to remember them. The Russians 
tend to consider writing things down an unnecessary 
step. They have grown up with the expectation of being 
told something once and being able to remember, and 
they tend to have great memories. 
In our Shuttle/Mir joint working groups, the  Russians 
usually gave verbal presentations on their Soyuz/Mir 
systems, and we took notes to remember what we 
were told. We used viewgraphs/PowerPoint charts 
or other written material to describe the orbiter 
systems. One factor may have been a lack of paper, as 
the Russians would write notes on the backs of used 
paper, and when visiting Russia we had to bring any 
paper we used with us. We noted this and eventually 
brought enough paper that we could share it with our 
counterparts. 
One example of this difference causing working/
communication challenges is when NASA astronauts 
train in Russian at Star City. They might listen to 
classroom lectures and take oral exams without any 
written material. This can be difficult and upsetting, 
especially with limited proficiency in the Russian 
language. Another example is when NASA astronaut 
Shannon Lucid gave her debrief after returning from 
her mission on Mir. She stated that when the two 
cosmonauts were preparing for an EVA outside the Mir 
station, they told Shannon a list of things to do if the 
ground called. Shannon asked them to wait a minute 
while she wrote the instructions down, but they said 
no, you will remember. 
Documentation may not be as necessary for the 
Russians, since they experience less turnover in 
experienced personnel. They rely on experts in their 
organization to remember things. In the U.S where 
personnel turnover is higher, good documentation 
is required to capture knowledge. Because many 
experienced Russian designers are aging and passing 
away, they are now doing more written documentation 
to pass on the knowledge to the younger engineers, 
whereas in the past the design expert would verbally 
pass on the information.  
Differences in spacecraft design philosophy and lack of 
understanding why a test requirement was necessary 
caused a significant conflict early in ISS assembly.  The 
Russian power system was designed to minimize the 
potential for electrical shorts to structure (28 Vdc 
power with return isolated from structure) and use 
integrated ground testing to identify electromagnetic 
interference issues. The U.S. power system used 
a single-point ground to structure to minimize 
potential electromagnetic interference and relied 
more on component-level testing. The Russians relied 
extensively on test data and were very reluctant to 
accept our modeling and simulation data. During the 
Shuttle/Mir Program any U.S. electrical hardware had 
to be sent first to Russia to be installed and operated in 
the Mir test facility before being allowed to be launched 
and operated on Mir. The Russians generally rely more 
on testing than NASA does, as opposed to analysis.
Early in ISS assembly the U.S. had electrical cables that 
needed to be installed on the Russian Segment. The 
cables were loaded onto the orbiter to be launched to 
the ISS. The Russians said they would first need to be 
tested in the ground test facility. The NASA ISS Program 
Manager argued that it was U.S. hardware, and it was 
launched over the strong objections of the Russian ISS 
Manager. The Russians said this hardware was not to 
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be used or operated on the Russian Segment, even if 
it was on the ISS. This resulted in the Joint American 
Russian Safety Working Group developing a process to 
address hardware being launched to the ISS without 
joint certification. The process was called “yellow tag,” 
because the hardware would be launched with an 
attached, visible yellow tag stating, “Not to be used or 
operated till ground confirms certification.” 
Unlike NASA, the Russians record the human errors 
committed by each cosmonaut during ground training 
and in flight, creating a human-performance/human-
error database. The information is useful for human 
factor engineers and safety personnel and is used 
to improve procedures, training, and the design of 
spacecraft controls and displays. The Russian chairman 
of the Joint American/Russian Safety Working Group 
estimated that 10-15% of spacecraft anomalies are 
due to crew error. Several space shuttle commanders 
agreed that 10% sounded right. In the early days of 
NASA, crew errors were a very sensitive subject and 
usually only discussed during private crew debriefs. 
This approach hindered data collection, analysis, and 
dissemination.
A good working relationship requires the development 
of mutual trust, a willingness to accept that your 
counterpart has a successful history of human 
spaceflight, and the attitude that we can learn from 
each other. Part of this trust is good communication. 
Be careful not to say that something can be done, if 
further approvals or constrains are involved. Make sure 
to communicate these issues, so if changes occur your 
Russian partners know why, and do not feel they were 
misled in order to reach an agreement. 
In addition to the working relationship, getting to know 
each other’s life and family experience can help. We 
spent time with our Russian colleagues after work, 
inviting them to our homes to share meals, go shopping, 
and visit local sites both in the U.S. and Russia. 
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Summary and Conclusions
Human spaceflight is challenging and dangerous. 
The history of our successes and failures must be 
communicated in order to prevent, or at least reduce, 
future accidents. The lessons in this paper are from 
my personal experience, but they will apply to future 
programs as NASA continues to send humans into orbit 
and beyond. Table 1 summarizes the themes and the 
lessons in this paper.
Chapter/Theme Mission Event Lesson
Redundancy can 
help or hinder
Apollo 10 Fuel cell failure Critical systems should be two-fault tolerant.
Apollo 12 Lightning strike Redundant systems for critical functions should be dissimilar and/
or located in different parts of the vehicle.
Skylab 3 Propellant leak Redundant systems must use compatible materials to be effective. 
Space 
Shuttle 
Program
Electrical Power 
System redundancy
Level of redundancy should be based on criticality, flight 
experience, and technology maturity. Unnecessary redundancy 
adds complexity, which increases cost and risk.
Expect the 
unexpected, 
and never stop 
learning 
Apollo 13 Oxygen tank 
explosion
Contingency procedures should be developed prior to the 
mission.
Apollo 14 Docking problem Anticipate how the system could fail and prepare potential work-
arounds.
Apollo 15 Propulsion system 
electrical short
The zero-gravity flight environment can create unexpected failures 
that would not have occurred on Earth.
Documentation 
and sharing 
information: 
communication 
is key
Apollo-
Saturn 
Mission 201
Loss of RCS Drawings should include all updates, even disconnected/unused 
circuits.
Apollo ECS Fire Lessons learned should be freely available and shared.
Apollo 8 Launch pad 
electrical test
Don’t count on anyone double-checking your work. Even when 
information is thoroughly documented and shared, in this case 
only one person was ensuring the information was correct. 
Apollo 11 SM entry Lessons learned should be freely available and shared.
Skylab 2 Emergency docking 
procedure
Organizational culture should encourage interdepartmental 
communication.
Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project
Service module 
inspection
Documentation should be updated following a design change, 
and all documentation should stay together. Allowing designers to 
inspect completed hardware can help to catch errors.
Human factors 
and crew error
Apollo 10 Inadvertent LM 
abort
Crew distraction, visibility, and mobility in the suit can impact the 
human-machine interaction.
Skylab 4 Loss of control 
during entry
Good labeling and positioning of switches are important for 
mitigating crew error during high-activity periods.
Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project
Second docking and 
CM entry
Crew training should include human factors awareness and should 
reflect the current vehicle configuration. Crew members should 
listen to the advice of the engineers who designed the system.
Table 1. Summary of Themes and Lessons
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Chapter/Theme Mission Event Lesson
Test as you fly, 
fly as you test, 
and the value of 
real-time testing
Apollo 7 Electrical short The flight environment must be thoroughly understood, and 
hardware should be tested to that environment if possible.
Apollo 16 Lunar Rover 
anomalies
The vehicle’s qualification test configuration should be the same 
as the flight configuration.
Delayed lunar 
descent
Making personnel from design, test, and operations available to 
support flight control at the MCC can be beneficial.
Politics is the 
enemy of good 
design
Space 
Shuttle 
Program
SSME electrical 
power design
Center competition can impact design. Cost and schedule had 
greater influence than design and safety.
Avionics computers Contractor’s business interests can impact design decisions.
Automatic 
versus manual 
control
Apollo 10 Inadvertent LM 
abort
Critical automatic functions should have a manual or unlike 
redundancy backup.
Skylab 4 Loss of RCS control
Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project
CM entry
Drawings help, 
but remember 
to inspect actual 
hardware
Apollo 4 Launch pad 
instrumentation 
electrical noise
Physical hardware, as well as design drawings, should be 
inspected during problem investigations.
Mars Viking 
Test
Test stand 
instrumentation 
electrical noise
Hazard analysis 
is critical
Apollo A-003 Booster fin failure Hazard analysis should indicate what the abort signal to spacecraft 
should be if the launch vehicle structurally fails. Parachute risers 
should be designed for the worst case environment.
Apollo-
Saturn 
Mission 201
Loss of RCS Hazard analysis should be performed on critical systems. Non-
functional circuits should be disconnected from power and return 
and identified on drawings.
Apollo ECS Fire Hazard analysis should be performed on critical test 
configurations.Apollo 1 Fire and loss of 
crew
Apollo 13 Oxygen tank 
explosion
Hazard analysis should be repeated following a design change.
Skylab 3 Propellant leak Hazard analysis should be performed on redundant systems, to 
ensure they provide the expected redundancy.
Killing “Death 
Star”
Shuttle/
Centaur 
Program
Cancellation of 
program
If you believe something is unsafe, be persistent in reporting your 
concerns, again and again if necessary. Safety organizations can 
make a difference. Schedule pressure can cause management to 
accept otherwise unacceptable levels of risk.
Working with 
the Russians
Career 
experience
Cultural differences Become familiar with cultural customs and symbols.
Educational 
differences
Oral versus written learning and memory.
Value of experience Reliance on experts versus documentation.
Design and 
organization
Different doesn’t mean wrong. Emphasis on testing and tracking 
of crew errors.
Trust Establish trust based on honesty and never commit to anything 
you’re not completely sure you can deliver.
Table 1. Summary of Themes and Lessons (continued)
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Acronyms
AC Alternating Current
ASTP Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
CM Command Module
CSM Command and Service Module
DC Direct Current
DOD Department of Defense
ECS Environmental Control System
EGIL Electrical, General Instrumentation, and 
Lighting
ELS Earth Landing System
FSO Flight Safety Office
H2 Hydrogen
ISS International Space Station
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LeRC Lewis Research Center
LM Lunar Module
LRV Lunar Rover Vehicle
MCC Mission Control Center
MER Mission Evaluation Room
MET Mission Elapsed Time
MSC Manned Spacecraft Center
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
NARSD North American Rockwell Space Division
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration
psi Pounds per Square Inch
RCS Reaction Control System
SAIC Science Applications International 
Corporation
SM Service Module
SMA Safety and Mission Assurance
SMJC Service Module Jettison Controller
SPS SM Propulsion System
SR&QA Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
STS Space Transportation System
U.S. United States
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Appendix A: Gary Johnson Career History
Education: 
• Bachelor of Science in Electrical 
Engineering, Oklahoma State 
University, 1964
• Masters in Business Administration, 
University of Houston at Clear Lake, 
1979
Career Experience:
• 1964-1969: NASA JSC (formerly Manned Spacecraft 
Center), Houston, Texas. Project Engineer in the 
Power Distribution and Sequencing Section. 
• 1969-1974: Subsystem Manager for the Sequential 
Subsystem for the Apollo Command and Service 
Module, Lunar Module vehicles, and the Skylab CSM. 
• 1971-1974: Group Leader for the Power Controls 
and Lightning Group in the Power Distribution and 
Control Branch. Test subject for space suits.
• 1974-1975: Subsystem Manager for the Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project electrical and sequential subsystems and 
member of the ASTP Working Group Number 4.
• July 1974-January 1975: Assigned to the Engineering 
Office, Space Shuttle Orbiter Project. Project Manager 
for Shuttle Avionics Lab electrical power distribution.
• 1975-1978: Head, Equipment and Installation 
Section in the Power Distribution and Control Branch 
of the Control Systems Development Division in the 
Engineering and Development Directorate. 
• March 1978-September 1978: Special Assistant to 
the Director, Office of the Director. 
• October 1978-June 1981: Deputy Chief, Electrical, 
Mechanical, and Environmental Systems Branch, 
Flight Control Division. Served as the Orbiter Flight 
Control Team Electrical, General Instrumentation, 
and Lighting (EGIL) flight controller during the first 
shuttle flight.
• June 1981-July 1983: Chief, Mechanical and Payload 
Systems Branch, Systems Division. 
• July 1983-October 1985: Chief, Guidance and 
Propulsion Systems Branch, Systems Division.
• October 1985-May 1997: Deputy Director, Safety, 
Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office. Also served 
as ISS Phase 1 NASA/Mir Program Joint 
Safety Assurance Working Group NASA 
Co-chairman from 1992 to 1998.
• May 1997-July 2003: Deputy 
Director of Russian Projects in SR&QA. 
Co-chairman of the ISS Program Joint 
American-Russian Safety Working 
Group.
• July 2003-January 2006: Associate 
Director for Technical, SMA Directorate. 
Member JSC Quality Systems Panel and NASA Quality 
Leadership Forum.
• April 2006-April 2010: Applied Research and 
Engineering Sciences Corporation Senior Risk 
Management Specialist.
• March 2007-June 2010: SAIC technical consultant on 
the Constellation Program. Member of Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle Standing Review Board for Safety.
• June 2007-present: SAIC/J&P Technologies SMA 
Contract technical consultant for the Flight Safety 
Office.
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